Combining epidemiological data and whole genome sequencing to understand SARS-CoV-2 transmission dynamics in a large tertiary care hospital during the first COVID-19 wave in The Netherlands focusing on healthcare workers.

BACKGROUND: Healthcare facilities have been challenged by the risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission between healthcare workers (HCW) and patients. During the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, infections among HCW were observed, questioning infection prevention and control (IPC) measures implemented at that time. AIM: This study aimed to identify nosocomial transmission routes of SARS-CoV-2 between HCW and patients in a tertiary care hospital. METHODS: All SARS-CoV-2 PCR positive HCW and patients identified between 1 March and 19 May 2020, were included in the analysis. Epidemiological data were collected from patient files and HCW contact tracing interviews. Whole genome sequences of SARS-CoV-2 were generated using Nanopore sequencing (WGS). Epidemiological clusters were identified, whereafter WGS and epidemiological data were combined for re-evaluation of epidemiological clusters and identification of potential transmission clusters. HCW infections were further classified into categories based on the likelihood that the infection was acquired via nosocomial transmission. Secondary cases were defined as COVID-19 cases in our hospital, part of a transmission cluster, of which the index case was either a patient or HCW from our hospital. FINDINGS: The study population consisted of 293 HCW and 245 patients. Epidemiological data revealed 36 potential epidemiological clusters, with an estimated 222 (75.7%) HCW as secondary cases. WGS results were available for 195 HCW (88.2%) and 20 patients (12.8%) who belonged to an epidemiological cluster. Re-evaluation of the epidemiological clusters, with the available WGS data identified 31 transmission clusters with 65 (29.4%) HCW as secondary cases. Transmission clusters were all part of 18 (50.0%) previously determined epidemiological clusters, demonstrating that several larger outbreaks actually consisted, of several smaller transmission clusters. A total of 21 (7.2%) HCW infections were classified as from confirmed nosocomial, of which 18 were acquired from another HCW and 3 from a patient. CONCLUSION: The majority of SARS-CoV-2 infections among HCW could be attributed to community-acquired infection. Infections among HCW that could be classified as due to nosocomial transmission, were mainly caused by HCW-to-HCW transmission rather than patient-to-HCW transmission. It is important to recognize the uncertainties of cluster analyses based solely on epidemiological data.

Risks of SARS-CoV-2 transmission between free-ranging animals and captive mink in the Netherlands.

In the Netherlands, 69 of the 126 (55%) mink farms in total became infected with SARS-CoV-2 in 2020. Despite strict biosecurity measures and extensive epidemiological investigations, the main transmission route remained unclear. A better understanding of SARS-CoV-2 transmission between mink farms is of relevance for countries where mink farming is still common practice and can be used as a case study to improve future emerging disease preparedness. We assessed whether SARS-CoV-2 spilled over from mink to free-ranging animals, and whether free-ranging animals may have played a role in farm-to-farm transmission in the Netherlands. The study encompassed farm visits, farm questionnaires, expert workshops and SARS-CoV-2 RNA and antibody testing of samples from target animal species (bats, birds and free-ranging carnivores). In this study, we show that the open housing system of mink allowed access to birds, bats and most free-ranging carnivores, and that direct and indirect contact with mink was likely after entry, especially for free-ranging carnivores and birds. This allowed SARS-CoV-2 exposure to animals entering the mink farm, and subsequent infection or mechanical carriage by the target animal species. Moreover, mink can escape farms in some cases, and two SARS-CoV-2-positive mink were found outside farm premises. No other SARS-CoV-2-RNA-positive free-ranging animals were detected, suggesting there was no abundant circulation in the species tested during the study period. To investigate previous SARS-CoV-2 infections, SARS-CoV-2 antibody detection using lung extracts of carcasses was set up and validated. One tested beech marten did have SARS-CoV-2 antibodies, but the closest SARS-CoV-2-infected mink farm was outside of its home range, making infection at a mink farm unlikely. Knowing that virus exchange between different species and the formation of animal reservoirs affects SARS-CoV-2 evolution, continued vigilance and monitoring of mink farms and surrounding wildlife remains vital.

Rise and fall of SARS-CoV-2 variants in Rotterdam: Comparison of wastewater and clinical surveillance.

Monitoring of SARS-CoV-2 in wastewater (WW) is a promising tool for epidemiological surveillance, correlating not only viral RNA levels with the infection dynamics within the population, but also to viral diversity. However, the complex mixture of viral lineages in WW samples makes tracking of specific variants or lineages circulating in the population a challenging task. We sequenced sewage samples of 9 WW-catchment areas within the city of Rotterdam, used specific signature mutations from individual SARS-CoV-2 lineages to estimate their relative abundances in WW and compared them against those observed in clinical genomic surveillance of infected individuals between September 2020 and December 2021. We showed that especially for dominant lineages, the median of the frequencies of signature mutations coincides with the occurrence of those lineages in Rotterdam's clinical genomic surveillance. This, along with digital droplet RT-PCR targeting signature mutations of specific variants of concern (VOCs), showed that several VOCs emerged, became dominant and were replaced by the next VOC in Rotterdam at different time points during the study. In addition, single nucleotide variant (SNV) analysis provided evidence that spatio-temporal clusters can also be discerned from WW samples. We were able to detect specific SNVs in sewage, including one resulting in the Q183H amino acid change in the Spike gene, that was not captured by clinical genomic surveillance. Our results highlight the potential use of WW samples for genomic surveillance, increasing the set of epidemiological tools to monitor SARS-CoV-2 diversity.

A Comprehensive Sampling Study on SARS-CoV-2 Contamination of Air and Surfaces in a Large Meat Processing Plant Experiencing COVID-19 Clusters in June 2020.

OBJECTIVE: We aimed to assess SARS-CoV-2 contamination of air and surfaces to gain insight into potential occupational exposure in a large meat processing plant experiencing COVID-19 clusters. Methods: Oro-nasopharyngeal SARS-CoV-2 screening was performed in 76 workers. Environmental samples ( n = 275) including air, ventilation systems, sewage, and swabs of high-touch surfaces and workers' hands were tested for SARS-CoV-2 RNA by real-time quantitative polymerase chain reaction. Results: Twenty-seven (35.5%) of the (predominantly asymptomatic) workers tested positive with modest to low viral loads (cycle threshold ≥ 29.7). Six of 203 surface swabs, 1 of 12 personal air samples, and one of four sewage samples tested positive; other samples tested negative. Conclusions: Although one third of workers tested positive, environmental contamination was limited. Widespread SARS-CoV-2 transmission via air and surfaces was considered unlikely within this plant at the time of investigation while strict COVID-19 control measures were already implemented.

Reduced Seasonal Coronavirus Antibody Responses in Children Following COVID-19 Mitigation Measures, The Netherlands.

SARS-CoV-2 prevention and control measures did not only impact SARS-CoV-2 circulation, but also the timing and prevalence of other seasonal respiratory viruses. Especially in children, information on exposure and infections to seasonal coronaviruses as well as SARS-CoV-2 in the first year of the pandemic is largely lacking. Therefore, we set up a one-year serological survey in a large tertiary hospital in the Netherlands. We show that seasonal coronavirus seroprevalence significantly decreased in 2021 in children less than one year, most likely due to COVID-19 control measures. The SARS-CoV-2 seroprevalence in children and adolescents increased from 0.4% to 11.3%, the highest in adolescents. This implies higher exposure rates in adolescents as compared to the general population (>18 years old). It is clear that there have been significant changes in the circulation and subsequent immunity against most respiratory pathogens as a result of the mitigation measures. The implications on shorter as well as longer term are still largely unknown, but the impact of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and subsequent control measures will continue to affect the dynamics of other pathogens.

Manifestation of SARS-CoV-2 Infections in Mink Related to Host-, Virus- and Farm-Associated Factors, The Netherlands 2020.

SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks on 69 Dutch mink farms in 2020 were studied to identify risk factors for virus introduction and transmission and to improve surveillance and containment measures. Clinical signs, laboratory test results, and epidemiological aspects were investigated, such as the date and reason of suspicion, housing, farm size and distances, human contact structure, biosecurity measures, and presence of wildlife, pets, pests, and manure management. On seven farms, extensive random sampling was performed, and age, coat color, sex, and clinical signs were recorded. Mild to severe respiratory signs and general diseases such as apathy, reduced feed intake, and increased mortality were detected on 62/69 farms. Throat swabs were more likely to result in virus detection than rectal swabs. Clinical signs differed between virus clusters and were more severe for dark-colored mink, males, and animals infected later during the year. Geographical clustering was found for one virus cluster. Shared personnel could explain some cases, but other transmission routes explaining farm-to-farm spread were not elucidated. An early warning surveillance system, strict biosecurity measures, and a (temporary) ban on mink farming and vaccinating animals and humans can contribute to reducing the risks of the virus spreading and acquisition of potential mutations relevant to human and animal health.

Poxvirus MVA Expressing SARS-CoV-2 S Protein Induces Robust Immunity and Protects Rhesus Macaques From SARS-CoV-2.

Novel safe, immunogenic, and effective vaccines are needed to control the COVID-19 pandemic, caused by SARS-CoV-2. Here, we describe the safety, robust immunogenicity, and potent efficacy elicited in rhesus macaques by a modified vaccinia virus Ankara (MVA) vector expressing a full-length SARS-CoV-2 spike (S) protein (MVA-S). MVA-S vaccination was well tolerated and induced S and receptor-binding domain (RBD)-binding IgG antibodies and neutralizing antibodies against SARS-CoV-2 and several variants of concern. S-specific IFNγ, but not IL-4, -producing cells were also elicited. After SARS-CoV-2 challenge, vaccinated animals showed a significant strong reduction of virus loads in bronchoalveolar lavages (BAL) and decreased levels in throat and nasal mucosa. Remarkably, MVA-S also protected macaques from fever and infection-induced cytokine storm. Computed tomography and histological examination of the lungs showed reduced lung pathology in MVA-S-vaccinated animals. These findings favor the use of MVA-S as a potential vaccine for SARS-CoV-2 in clinical trials.

Experimental and field investigations of exposure, replication and transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in pigs in the Netherlands.

In order to assess the risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection, transmission and reservoir development in swine, we combined results of an experimental and two observational studies. First, intranasal and intratracheal challenge of eight pigs did not result in infection, based on clinical signs and PCR on swab and lung tissue samples. Two serum samples returned a low positive result in virus neutralization, in line with findings in other infection experiments in pigs. Next, a retrospective observational study was performed in the Netherlands in the spring of 2020. Serum samples (N =417) obtained at slaughter from 17 farms located in a region with a high human case incidence in the first wave of the pandemic. Samples were tested with protein micro array, plaque reduction neutralization test and receptor-binding-domain ELISA. None of the serum samples was positive in all three assays, although six samples from one farm returned a low positive result in PRNT (titers 40-80). Therefore we conclude that serological evidence for large scale transmission was not observed. Finally, an outbreak of respiratory disease in pigs on one farm, coinciding with recent exposure to SARS-CoV-2 infected animal caretakers, was investigated. Tonsil swabs and paired serum samples were tested. No evidence for infection with SARS-CoV-2 was found. In conclusion, Although in both the experimental and the observational study few samples returned low antibody titer results in PRNT infection with SARS-CoV-2 was not confirmed. It was concluded that sporadic infections in the field cannot be excluded, but large-scale SARS-CoV-2 transmission among pigs is unlikely.

Diminished amplification of SARS-CoV-2 ORF1ab in a commercial dual-target qRT-PCR diagnostic assay.

Here we describe a SARS-CoV-2 variant with diminished amplification of the ORF ORF1ab target in the Cobas® dual-target SARS-CoV-2 assay resulting in a discrepancy of Ct-values (Ct-value 20.7 for the E-gene and Ct-value 30.2 for ORF1ab). Five unique nucleotide mutations were identified in ORF1ab: C11450A (nsp10) C14178T (RdRp), G15006T (RdRp), G18394T (Hel), and G20995T (Hel). This case highlights the importance of surveillance of genomic regions used in molecular diagnostics and the importance of the public release of target regions used to update commercial and in-house developed SARS-CoV-2 PCR tests. This work underpins the importance of using dual-targets in molecular diagnostic assays to limit the change of false-negative results due to primer and/or probe mismatches.

Adaptation, spread and transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in farmed minks and associated humans in the Netherlands.

In the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic (April 2020), SARS-CoV-2 was detected in farmed minks and genomic sequencing was performed on mink farms and farm personnel. Here, we describe the outbreak and use sequence data with Bayesian phylodynamic methods to explore SARS-CoV-2 transmission in minks and humans on farms. High number of farm infections (68/126) in minks and farm workers (>50% of farms) were detected, with limited community spread. Three of five initial introductions of SARS-CoV-2 led to subsequent spread between mink farms until November 2020. Viruses belonging to the largest cluster acquired an amino acid substitution in the receptor binding domain of the Spike protein (position 486), evolved faster and spread longer and more widely. Movement of people and distance between farms were statistically significant predictors of virus dispersal between farms. Our study provides novel insights into SARS-CoV-2 transmission between mink farms and highlights the importance of combining genetic information with epidemiological information when investigating outbreaks at the animal-human interface.

Are presymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infections in nursing home residents unrecognised symptomatic infections? Sequence and metadata from weekly testing in an extensive nursing home outbreak.

BACKGROUND: Sars-CoV-2 outbreaks resulted in a high case fatality rate in nursing homes (NH) worldwide. It is unknown to which extent presymptomatic residents and staff contribute to the spread of the virus. AIMS: To assess the contribution of asymptomatic and presymptomatic residents and staff in SARS-CoV-2 transmission during a large outbreak in a Dutch NH. METHODS: Observational study in a 185-bed NH with two consecutive testing strategies: testing of symptomatic cases only, followed by weekly facility-wide testing of staff and residents regardless of symptoms. Nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal testing with RT-PCR for SARs-CoV-2, including sequencing of positive samples, was conducted with a standardised symptom assessment. RESULTS: 185 residents and 244 staff participated. Sequencing identified one cluster. In the symptom-based test strategy period, 3/39 residents were presymptomatic versus 38/74 residents in the period of weekly facility-wide testing (P-value < 0.001). In total, 51/59 (91.1%) of SARS-CoV-2 positive staff was symptomatic, with no difference between both testing strategies (P-value 0.763). Loss of smell and taste, sore throat, headache or myalga was hardly reported in residents compared to staff (P-value <0.001). Median Ct-value of presymptomatic residents was 21.3, which did not differ from symptomatic (20.8) or asymptomatic (20.5) residents (P-value 0.624). CONCLUSIONS: Symptoms in residents and staff are insufficiently recognised, reported or attributed to a possible SARS-CoV-2 infection. However, residents without (recognised) symptoms showed the same potential for viral shedding as residents with symptoms. Weekly testing was an effective strategy for early identification of SARS-Cov-2 cases, resulting in fast mitigation of the outbreak.

The next phase of SARS-CoV-2 surveillance: real-time molecular epidemiology.

The current coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic is the first to apply whole-genome sequencing near to real time, with over 2 million severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) whole-genome sequences generated and shared through the GISAID platform. This genomic resource informed public health decision-making throughout the pandemic; it also allowed detection of mutations that might affect virulence, pathogenesis, host range or immune escape as well as the effectiveness of SARS-CoV-2 diagnostics and therapeutics. However, genotype-to-phenotype predictions cannot be performed at the rapid pace of genomic sequencing. To prepare for the next phase of the pandemic, a systematic approach is needed to link global genomic surveillance and timely assessment of the phenotypic characteristics of novel variants, which will support the development and updating of diagnostics, vaccines, therapeutics and nonpharmaceutical interventions. This Review summarizes the current knowledge on key viral mutations and variants and looks to the next phase of surveillance of the evolving pandemic.

Occupational and environmental exposure to SARS-CoV-2 in and around infected mink farms.

OBJECTIVE: Unprecedented SARS-CoV-2 infections in farmed minks raised immediate concerns regarding transmission to humans and initiated intensive environmental investigations to assess occupational and environmental exposure. METHODS: Air sampling was performed at infected Dutch mink farms, at farm premises and at nearby residential sites. A range of other environmental samples were collected from minks' housing units, including bedding materials. SARS-CoV-2 RNA was analysed in all samples by quantitative PCR. RESULTS: Inside the farms, considerable levels of SARS-CoV-2 RNA were found in airborne dust, especially in personal inhalable dust samples (approximately 1000-10 000 copies/m3). Most of the settling dust samples tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA (82%, 75 of 92). SARS-CoV-2 RNA was not detected in outdoor air samples, except for those collected near the entrance of the most recently infected farm. Many samples of minks' housing units and surfaces contained SARS-CoV-2 RNA. CONCLUSIONS: Infected mink farms can be highly contaminated with SARS-CoV-2 RNA. This warns of occupational exposure, which was substantiated by considerable SARS-CoV-2 RNA concentrations in personal air samples. Dispersion of SARS-CoV-2 to outdoor air was found to be limited and SARS-CoV-2 RNA was not detected in air samples collected beyond farm premises, implying a negligible risk of environmental exposure to nearby communities. Our occupational and environmental risk assessment is in line with whole genome sequencing analyses showing mink-to-human transmission among farm workers, but no indications of direct zoonotic transmission events to nearby communities.

Author Correction: Rapid SARS-CoV-2 whole-genome sequencing and analysis for informed public health decision-making in the Netherlands.

An amendment to this paper has been published and can be accessed via a link at the top of the paper.

SARS-CoV-2 infection in cats and dogs in infected mink farms.

Animals like mink, cats and dogs are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection. In the Netherlands, 69 out of 127 mink farms were infected with SARS-CoV-2 between April and November 2020 and all mink on infected farms were culled after SARS-CoV-2 infection to prevent further spread of the virus. On some farms, (feral) cats and dogs were present. This study provides insight into the prevalence of SARS-CoV-2-positive cats and dogs in 10 infected mink farms and their possible role in transmission of the virus. Throat and rectal swabs of 101 cats (12 domestic and 89 feral cats) and 13 dogs of 10 farms were tested for SARS-CoV-2 using PCR. Serological assays were performed on serum samples from 62 adult cats and all 13 dogs. Whole Genome Sequencing was performed on one cat sample. Cat-to-mink transmission parameters were estimated using data from all 10 farms. This study shows evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection in 12 feral cats and 2 dogs. Eleven cats (18%) and two dogs (15%) tested serologically positive. Three feral cats (3%) and one dog (8%) tested PCR-positive. The sequence generated from the cat throat swab clustered with mink sequences from the same farm. The calculated rate of mink-to-cat transmission showed that cats on average had a chance of 12% (95%CI 10%-18%) of becoming infected by mink, assuming no cat-to-cat transmission. As only feral cats were infected it is most likely that infections in cats were initiated by mink, not by humans. Whether both dogs were infected by mink or humans remains inconclusive. This study presents one of the first reports of interspecies transmission of SARS-CoV-2 that does not involve humans, namely mink-to-cat transmission, which should also be considered as a potential risk for spread of SARS-CoV-2.

Unraveling the Modes of Transmission of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) During a Nursing Home Outbreak: Looking Beyond the Church Superspreading Event.

BACKGROUND: An outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in a nursing home in the Netherlands, following an on-site church service held on 8 March 2020, triggered an investigation to unravel sources and chain(s) of transmission. METHODS: Epidemiological data were collected from registries and through a questionnaire among church attendees. Symptomatic residents and healthcare workers (HCWs) were tested for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) by reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction and subjected to whole genome sequencing (WGS). Sequences from a selection of people from the same area were included as community reference. RESULTS: After the church service, 30 of 39 attendees (77%) developed symptoms; 14 (11 residents and 3 nonresidents) were tested and were positive for COVID-19. In the following 5 weeks, 62 of 300 residents (21%) and 30 of 640 HCWs (5%) tested positive for COVID-19; 21 of 62 residents (34%) died. The outbreak was controlled through a cascade of measures. WGS of samples from residents and HCWs identified a diversity of sequence types, grouped into 8 clusters. Seven resident church attendees all were infected with distinct viruses, 4 of which belonged to 2 larger clusters in the nursing home. CONCLUSIONS: Although initial investigation suggested the church service as the source of the outbreak, detailed analysis showed a more complex picture, most consistent with widespread regional circulation of the virus in the weeks before the outbreak, and multiple introductions into the nursing home before the visitor ban. The findings underscore the importance of careful outbreak investigations to understand SARS-CoV-2 transmission to develop evidence-based mitigation measures.

Evaluation of a multi-species SARS-CoV-2 surrogate virus neutralization test.

Assays to measure SARS-CoV-2-specific neutralizing antibodies are important to monitor seroprevalence, to study asymptomatic infections and to reveal (intermediate) hosts. A recently developed assay, the surrogate virus-neutralization test (sVNT) is a quick and commercially available alternative to the "gold standard" virus neutralization assay using authentic virus, and does not require processing at BSL-3 level. The assay relies on the inhibition of binding of the receptor binding domain (RBD) on the spike (S) protein to human angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (hACE2) by antibodies present in sera. As the sVNT does not require species- or isotype-specific conjugates, it can be similarly used for antibody detection in human and animal sera. In this study, we used 298 sera from PCR-confirmed COVID-19 patients and 151 sera from patients confirmed with other coronavirus or other (respiratory) infections, to evaluate the performance of the sVNT. To analyze the use of the assay in a One Health setting, we studied the presence of RBD-binding antibodies in 154 sera from nine animal species (cynomolgus and rhesus macaques, ferrets, rabbits, hamsters, cats, cattle, mink and dromedary camels). The sVNT showed a moderate to high sensitivity and a high specificity using sera from confirmed COVID-19 patients (91.3% and 100%, respectively) and animal sera (93.9% and 100%), however it lacked sensitivity to detect low titers. Significant correlations were found between the sVNT outcomes and PRNT50 and the Wantai total Ig and IgM ELISAs. While species-specific validation will be essential, our results show that the sVNT holds promise in detecting RBD-binding antibodies in multiple species.

Outbreak of COVID-19 on an industrial ship.

BACKGROUND: People on ships are at high risk for outbreaks of infectious diseases including coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). A rapid and well-coordinated response is important to curb transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). We studied an outbreak on an industrial ship to improve outbreak control for ships and coordination between participating harbour partners. MATERIALS AND METHODS: Public Health Service (PHS) Rotterdam-Rijnmond performed an epidemiological investigation during the outbreak of COVID-19 among 77 seafarers on a ship in their port. The captain was interviewed about ship details and his experiences during the outbreak. The seafarers were asked to fill in questionnaires about symptoms suspicious of COVID-19 and date of symptom onset. Information about stakeholders involved in outbreak control was registered. RESULTS: The captain first contacted PHS about probable cases on March 31st 2020 via a physician ashore. One crewmember was hospitalised on April 8th and another died unexpectedly aboard on April 10th. Questionnaires distributed mid-April to the 75 remaining seafarers showed that 38 of 60 responders (63%) had had suspicious symptoms between February 15th and April 13th. None of them were tested but a total of 8 other crewmembers tested positive for COVID-19 after leaving the ship, including the hospitalised crewmember and the one who died aboard. On May 5th, the last case left isolation and the quarantine ended. Many different stakeholders were involved in the outbreak response and responsibilities were not always fully clear beforehand, causing coordination issues. CONCLUSIONS: Testing crew with COVID-19 symptoms underpins control measures and clarifies communication between stakeholders. Building a network beforehand to develop outbreak guidelines tailored to ships and local circumstances is essential to control future outbreaks on ships.